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This paper explores how the norms of belief relate to the norms of action. The discussion
centres on addressing a challenge from positive illusions stating that the demands we
face as believers aiming at the truth and the demands we face as agents aiming at
success often pull in opposite directions. In response to this challenge, it is argued
that the pursuits of aiming at the truth and aiming at success are fully compatible and
mutually reinforcing. More speciﬁcally, the link between the two takes the form of a
two-way connection. In addition to succeeding in virtue of getting it right, it is
normatively appropriate to get it right in virtue of succeeding. This two-way
connection thesis is supported by a wide scope reading of how the truth norm of
belief may be satisﬁed. On this reading, believing p is permissible both as a result
of settling the question of whether p in light of the available evidence and as a result
of engaging a believer’s agency in making it the case that p.
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This paper will aim to explore how the norms of belief relate to the norms of action. The
discussion will centre on addressing a challenge from positive illusions stating that the
demands we face as believers aiming at the truth and the demands we face as agents
aiming at success often pull in opposite directions. Responding to this challenge is impor-
tant for proponents of a normative notion of belief and respectively action.1 If the norms of
belief and action are at odds with each other as the challenge states, either set of norms is
ultimately reduced to a bundle of ad hoc recommendations. In response to this challenge, it
will be argued that the pursuits of aiming at the truth and aiming at success are fully com-
patible and mutually reinforcing. More speciﬁcally, the link between the two takes the form
of a two-way connection. In addition to succeeding in virtue of getting it right, it is norma-
tively appropriate to get it right in virtue of succeeding. This two-way connection thesis is
supported by a wide scope reading of how the truth norm of belief may be satisﬁed. On this
reading, believing p is permissible both as a result of settling the question of whether p in
light of the available evidence and as a result of engaging a believer’s agency in making it
the case that p.
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets out the normative notions of belief
and action by reﬂecting on a pair of contrasting metaphors: “belief aims at the truth,”
“action aims at success.” An intuitive way of linking up the norms of belief and action,
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the one-way connection thesis is then introduced. On this thesis, the link between the two
domains takes the form of succeeding in virtue of getting it right. Satisfying the success
norm of action follows from satisfying the truth norm of belief. Section 2 clariﬁes the chal-
lenge from positive illusions. These illusions form a pattern of apparently false beliefs that
agents are better off with rather than without. This looks like a counterexample where suc-
ceeding comes about in virtue of getting it wrong. To sharpen up the challenge a follow-up
vignette is discussed. In this vignette, success in action correlates with delusional beliefs,
which unlike positive illusions present extreme distortions of reality. Section 3 critically
explores two responses to the challenge that can be derived from the so-called wrong
kind of reasons argument. Each response reafﬁrms in its way that truth is the only standard
of correctness for belief and so success in action ought to be rejected as a reason of the
wrong kind. Yet, in so doing both responses fail to address the issue at the heart of the chal-
lenge, how the norms of belief relate to the norms of action. Section 4 addresses this issue
by articulating the two-way connection thesis. In addition to a wide scope reading of the
truth norm, the argument in favour of this thesis builds on an Anscombian notion of prac-
tical knowledge as non-observational and causally efﬁcacious with respect to successful
actions.2 Positive illusions are then revisited and explained away as cases where the truth
norm of belief is satisﬁed by satisfying the success norm of action. In anticipation of poss-
ible objections, the same interpretation is applied to the vignette of so-called positive
delusions.
1. Linking the norms of belief and the norms of action: succeeding in virtue of
getting it right
Belief aims at the truth. Since the publication of Bernard Williams’s “Deciding to Believe”
(1973), in which it ﬁrst appeared, this formulation has gained traction in contemporary epis-
temology debates. Adopted across a variety of positions, it is meant to capture an essential
feature of belief as distinct propositional attitude. This feature is belief’s particular relation-
ship to truth. There are two main ways to cash out this relationship. The ﬁrst is to read
“belief aims at the truth” literally, ascribing a natural telos, as it were, to belief. Hence
the name of accounts that endorse such a reading: teleological. A central feature they
have in common is to interpret the relationship of belief to truth in evaluative as opposed
to prescriptive terms. It is good or valuable for beliefs to be true, bad or disvaluable for
them to be false. Thus, beliefs are assessed exclusively on whether or not they achieve
their aim, to have true as opposed to false content. This teleological assessment implies
that truth is the only standard of correctness for beliefs. However, it does not necessarily
ground any corresponding obligation or prescription for believers. As McHugh (2012,
10) points out expanding on a teleological interpretation of truth as the standard of correct-
ness for beliefs:
Something may be bad without its badness being a matter of anyone’s having done anything
they ought not to have done, and without its being the case that there is anyone who ought
to change it; some prospective state of affairs or object may be good without its being the
case that there is anyone who ought to produce it or bring it about. Evaluations do not presup-
pose accountability or blameworthiness.3
By contrast, the second way to cash out belief’s relationship to truth presupposes a meta-
phorical reading of the formulation “belief aims at the truth.” Beliefs are said to aim at
the truth to the extent that believers should aim at having true as opposed to false
beliefs. As Littlejohn (2013, 293) puts it:
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The talk of aims should be understood metaphorically, and the metaphor interpreted in norma-
tive terms. Your beliefs are defective if they don’t ﬁt the facts. They shouldn’t be like that and
you shouldn’t have beliefs like that.
Like teleological accounts, normative accounts that endorse this metaphorical reading con-
sider truth to offer the only standard of correctness for belief. This standard, however, is
expressed in prescriptive or strictly normative as opposed to evaluative or weakly norma-
tive terms. And so the metaphor “Belief aims at the truth” is meant to showcase truth as the
fundamental epistemic norm grounding the assessment of both beliefs and believers.4 The
direct link between the two assessments is ensured by the idea of epistemic “oughts,” nor-
mative requirements believers face with respect to how they form or refrain from forming
new beliefs, maintain, revise or disavow existing beliefs. This feature of normative accounts
makes them better suited than teleological accounts for the discussion to follow. In particu-
lar, the conceptual framework developed by normative accounts allows for a neater com-
parison with the normative requirements agents face with respect to how they form or
refrain from forming new practical commitments, pursue, revise or disengage with existing
ones. And so a normative notion of belief will be assumed throughout the discussion to
follow.5 Having said that, the conclusions we’ll reach are also consistent with a teleological
notion to the extent that this notion implies some kind of recommendation for believers,
such as: it would be better if you had true rather than false beliefs. This is because rec-
ommendations contain normative claims, albeit considerably weaker than the “oughts”
of prescriptions and prohibitions. And in so far as a teleological notion of belief is meant
to ﬁt a cogent picture of epistemic reasons, including reasons to believe, weakly normative
claims about the business of believers in the format of recommendations cannot be readily
dismissed by teleologists.6
To recap, on the normative notion of belief adopted for the purposes of the present
inquiry, the formulation “belief aims at the truth” is a handy metaphor. It captures the stan-
dard of correctness that deﬁnes epistemic assessment: beliefs are correct only if they are
true. At the same time, it conveys the thought that believers should aim at having true as
opposed to false beliefs.
If belief can be said to aim at the truth, action can be said to aim at success. The notion
of action assumed in the discussion to follow is also normative. More speciﬁcally, it is pre-
mised on the Aristotelian idea of actions as various kinds of achievements that by the same
token are open to various kinds of failures. This normative notion of action as achievement
has been explored in detail elsewhere (Radoilska 2013). For the purposes of the present
inquiry, sufﬁces to say that on this notion, the formulation “action aims at success” captures
the completion or satisfaction condition on an agent’s intention.7 Intention here is under-
stood in terms of trying that might or might not be successful. So-called instances of prac-
tical irrationality, such as weakness of will, accidie and procrastination provide clear
examples where the satisfaction condition on intention has not been met. The issue is
often attributed to some kind of qualiﬁed ignorance of what one is doing.8 By contrast,
actions which meet that condition are deﬁned as the particular objects of a special kind
of knowledge only an agent as opposed to observer may have. Following Anscombe
(1963) and the earlier scholastic tradition, on which she draws, the knowledge agents
have of their own actions is referred to in current discussions as “practical knowledge.”
Practical knowledge has two distinguishing features. Firstly, it has to be in some sense
“prior to its objects.” Secondly, it is said to be “without observation.” The speciﬁcs of both
features are subject of intense philosophical debates. For instance, the priority of practical
knowledge over its objects might be ﬂeshed out in terms of its being their efﬁcient as
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opposed to formal cause. Similarly, the non-observational character of practical knowledge
might be explained in terms of its function as opposed to its source.9 These ongoing dis-
agreements notwithstanding, there are important areas of consensus. They include, in par-
ticular, the thought that the two features are closely related in a way that takes into account
the active role of agents in ensuring the ﬁt between their own actions and the practical
knowledge they have of them. A recent account put forward in Schwenkler (2011) provides
a compelling articulation of this thought as it links directly the causal input of practical
knowledge to its non-observational character. As Schwenkler puts it: “it is because an
agent’s knowledge of what he is intentionally doing is essentially a part of the action
itself that he knows about that action in a way that an outside observer cannot” (149–
150). Thus, on Schwenkler’s account, practical knowledge is non-observational because
of the active role that it plays in monitoring and guiding the action as it unfolds, from
the inside. This is not to deny that practical knowledge is acquired partly through
sensory perception. For an agent’s perception of her own action differs critically from
the perception of a well-placed observer, which remains moot as to how the action
unfolds. In Schwenkler’s words: “observation involves not just perceiving something,
but doing so somehow passively; to observe something is to sit back, as it were, and
simply take it in for whatever it happens to be” (146).10
As we can see from this account, practical knowledge forms an integral part of an action
to the extent that it is instrumental in meeting the satisfaction condition on its agent’s inten-
tion. Returning to our initial formulation “action aims at success,” we are now in a position
to specify the particular contribution of practical knowledge: to sustain agential achieve-
ment in addition to, sometimes independently of observational input.
Discussions on the normativity of belief do not always make an explicit connection to
success or other, derivative norms that apply exclusively to actions. However, there is
growing literature aiming to shed light on the interplay between the norms of action and
the norms of belief.11 This development is only natural as our lives of believers and
agents are inexorably intertwined. For this reason, it is important to ascertain whether
and how the requirements that apply to us as believers relate to the requirements that
apply to us as agents. To do so, two related questions need to be addressed: Is aiming at
truth always consistent with aiming at success? How do the norms of belief underpinned
by truth as standard of correctness relate to the norms of action underpinned by success
as standard of achievement?
An intuitive way to link up the norms of action and the norms of belief is to posit a
robust one-way connection from true belief to successful action. For instance, if I am mis-
taken about the whereabouts of my new University’s library, I will fail to get hold of the
books that I want to borrow. False beliefs are likely to stand in the way of success in
action. Railton (1997, 58) pursues further this line of thought and argues that being “in
the belief business” is a pre-condition of agency. Only to the extent that belief is held to
account to truth and evidence, can our actions bring about their intended outcomes reliably.
By satisfying the truth norm in our capacity of believers, we get on the way to satisfying the
success norm in our capacity of agents.
The one-way connection thesis offers an attractive account of how the norms of belief
relate to the norms of action: The direct link from the overarching norm of the one to the
overarching norm of the other domain is a particular advantage. In addition to simplicity,
it imposes a clear order of priority in how these two separate overarching norms should
be attended. For on the one-way connection account, satisfying the truth norm of belief
is non-accidentally conducive to satisfying the success norm of action but not the other
way around.
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Importantly, this account is not undermined by instances in which our believing false-
hoods might lead us to success in action accidentally, just like we might chance on a fortune
while taking the wrong way. Yet, establishing a stronger, reliable link from false belief to
successful action would present a serious challenge. The positive illusions studies in psy-
chology (Taylor and Brown 1988; Taylor 1989) and more recently philosophy (Elga
2005; Bortolotti and Antrobus 2015) seem to have done just that.
The following section will provide an overview of what positive illusions are. The chal-
lenge they pose to the one-way connection thesis will then be explained in contrast to
another challenge that arises from, as we may call them, positive delusions.
2. Positive illusions or positive delusions: succeeding in virtue of getting it wrong?
Introducing the term for the ﬁrst time, Taylor and Brown (1988, 194) deﬁne positive illu-
sions as “unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control and
unrealistic optimism.” They argue that positive illusions are not only prevalent in the
general non-pathological population but also provide important beneﬁts, such as better
adjustment to one’s environment, greater creativity and productivity and the ability to
persist in the face of adversity. In sum, positive illusions “can be associated with higher
motivation, greater persistence, more effective performance and ultimately, greater
success” (199).
The correlation between positive illusions and success poses a challenge to the one-way
connection thesis. The challenge is as follows. Some degree of self-enhancing inaccuracy
correlates better with success in action than accurate self-appraisal. This correlation argu-
ably points to a pattern of false beliefs that agents are better off with rather than without.
These two aspects of the challenge – ﬁrst that there is a clear pattern of false yet beneﬁcial
beliefs and second that their content represents a mild distortion of reality only – are closely
related.
Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) are careful to point out that positive illusions may have
an enabling effect to the extent that the fall short of extreme distortion. For instance, their
response to critics querying the positive role of exaggerated perception of control is as
follows:
It is important to reiterate that the illusion of control typically represents a mild distortion in
domains over which people actually have some control. Like the other illusions, the illusion
of control is not typically held about things that are completely uncontrollable . . . (Taylor
and Brown 1994, 24)
In this respect, Taylor and Brown contrast positive illusions with delusions and in particular
delusions of grandeur, which also have a self-enhancing aspect. Unlike positive illusions,
however, delusions of grandeur depart from reality in a radical way, as it were, without
keeping an eye on the facts. The contrast between illusions and delusions is further explored
in Taylor (1989). Distinguishing another positive illusion, unrealistic optimism from delu-
sions about one’s prospects, Taylor writes:
Unrealistic optimism about the future is highly and appropriately responsive to the objective
qualities of the events . . . When people receive objective evidence about the likelihood of
risks, they change their estimates accordingly. These qualities most clearly distinguish illusion
from delusion. Delusions are false beliefs that persist despite the facts. Illusions accommodate
them, though perhaps reluctantly . . . positive events are simply regarded as somewhat
more likely and negative events as somewhat less likely to occur than it is actually the case.
(55)
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To recap, positive illusions challenge the one-way connection thesis because they form an
identiﬁable pattern of beliefs, whose falsehood apparently promotes success in action. As
we observed in the previous section, successful action may occasionally be propped up
by a false belief. Such occurrences do not undermine the one-way connection thesis.
Being accidental prevents them from grounding an alternative recommendation for believ-
ers who are also agents. By contrast, positive illusions seem to aptly support such a rec-
ommendation. With regard to “overrating oneself” (Elga 2005), they make a case for
succeeding in virtue of getting it wrong. The well-deﬁned pattern of false yet beneﬁcial
beliefs that emerges from discussions on positive illusions is particularly perplexing as it
relates directly to the appraisal of a believer’s own agency and prospects of success.12
For this kind of self-appraisal is also a central case for the one-way connection thesis,
where satisfying the overarching norm of belief should lead straight to satisfying the over-
arching norm of action. So the challenge from positive illusions is that they show an appar-
ent pattern of succeeding in virtue of getting it wrong in an area where succeeding in virtue
of getting it right should be unproblematic. Thus, positive illusions mark a normative cross-
roads where aiming at the truth and aiming at success seem to bifurcate.
To widen up further the possible distance between these two aims and the competing
normative requirements to which they give rise, let us consider an additional vignette.
As we shall see, in this vignette successful action is apparently premised on delusional
beliefs. In contrast to positive illusions, these positive delusions cannot be said to present
a mild distortion of reality only. Instead, they exhibit head-on resistance to facts as indicated
by Taylor (1989). In this respect, the vignette offers a further test case for the challenge to
the one-way connection thesis we ﬁst formulated by reﬂecting on positive illusions. This is
because the correlation between positive illusions and success in action might still be
accounted for on the one-way connection model: as mild distortions, positive illusions
might also be considered as accurate enough to support successful action. In other
words, without a starker counterpart in the realm of delusions, the possible split between
aiming at the truth and aiming at success in the realm of positive illusions could be
explained away. More speciﬁcally, it could be argued that the beneﬁts mild distortions
offer to agents are due to their relative accuracy rather than relative inaccuracy. Following
this line of thought, positive illusions would be recast as typical beliefs aiming at the truth
and getting close enough to it to support successful action. If so, the one-way connection
thesis would remain unchallenged. Considering a speciﬁc vignette of positive delusions
in contrast to positive illusions will allow us to address the challenge in earnest. The vign-
ette is as follows.
Simon, aged 40, lawyer
Simon was a senior, black, American lawyer from a middle-class, Baptist family. Although
not a religious man he had had occasional relatively minor psychic experiences that had led him
from time to time to seek the guidance of a professional “seer.” Otherwise his career and life
generally were going well.
Then, out of the blue, he was threatened by a malpractice legal action from a group of his
colleagues. Although he claimed to be innocent, mounting a defence would be expensive
and hazardous. He responded to this crisis by praying in front of an open bible placed on a
small altar that he set up in his front room. After an emotional evening’s “outpouring” he
found that wax from two large candles on the altar had run down onto the bible marking out
various words and phrases (he called these wax marks “seals” or “suns”). He described his
experiences thus.
I got up and I saw the seal that was in my father’s bible and I called my friend John and I said,
you know, “something remarkable is going on over here.” I think the beauty of it was the speci-
ﬁcity by which the sun burned through. It was . . . in my mind, a clever play on words.
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From this time on, Simon received a complex series of “revelations” largely conveyed
through the images left in melted candle wax. They meant nothing to anyone else including
Simon’s Baptist friends and family. But for Simon they were clearly representations of biblical
symbols particularly from the book of Revelations (the bull, the 24 elders, the arc of the cove-
nant, etc.) signifying that “I am the living son of David . . . and I’m also a relative of Ishmael
and . . . of Joseph.” He was also the “captain of the guard of Israel.” He found this role carried
awesome responsibilities: “Sometimes I’m saying – Oh my God, why did you choose me, and
there’s no answer to that.” His special status had the effect of “increasing my own inward sense,
wisdom, understanding, and endurance” which would “allow me to do whatever is required in
terms of bringing whatever message it is that God wants me to bring.” When confronted with
scepticism, he said simply: “I don’t get upset, because I know within myself, what I know” . . .
Simon’s “seals” as we indicated empowered him. But more than this they guided him ﬁrst to
take on his accusers and then over how to run his case (as a lawyer he defended himself). To cut
a long story short the result was that he won his case (it was shown to be a racially motivated
attempt to undermine his growing practice), his reputation as a lawyer was further enhanced, he
went on to make a great deal of money, and when last heard of was setting up a trust fund to
support research not on schizophrenia but on religious experience. (Fulford and Radoilska
2012, 62)
The vignette brings into relief the elements of the challenge to the one-way connection
thesis: apparent disregard for the overarching norm of belief and satisfaction of the over-
arching norm of action. Simon’s professional success is not undermined by his delusional
beliefs. On the contrary, there is a credible link between his taking himself to be a person of
increased wisdom, understanding and endurance beyond the ordinary and his daring
defence against his former colleagues that ultimately pays off, against the odds. As indi-
cated by Simon’s response to contesters, the self-assessment, which informs his actions,
is not only unsupported by evidence it its initial formation, but also unresponsive to
review in light of subsequently acquired contrary evidence. Thus, applying the test of
whether delusions should be considered as faulty beliefs or, alternatively, described as a
different state altogether, “beyond believing badly” that was recently proposed by Sam
Wilkinson (2013), Simon’s delusions would be a clear-cut instance of “believing badly.”
As Wilkinson puts it:
If we want to claim that delusional patients don’t really believe what they assert, it is not to
resistance in the face of contradictory evidence, or to lack of supporting evidence during for-
mation, that we should turn. This tells us whether they are believing badly (and actually pre-
supposes that they are believing). Rather, we need to show that the deluded patient is, all things
considered, failing to act or reason in accordance with her professed beliefs. Only then should
we say that she doesn’t truly believe what she appears to. (166)
Since Simon’s delusions are integrated into the account he provides of his reasons for
action, they would qualify as faulty and irrational beliefs (Bortolotti 2009) rather than
some other cognitive attitude that does not require accepting the truth of the content it rep-
resents.13 And so, the vignette seems to offer a stark illustration of succeeding by getting it
wrong where extreme distortion of reality is paired up with real success. As argued earlier,
this illustration consolidates the challenge from positive illusions because it provides a
clearer counterpart to the emerging gap between satisfying the truth norm of belief and
satisfying the success norm of action in instances of mild self-enhancing distortions of
reality. This gap is at odds with the picture of how the norms of belief relate to the
norms of action supported by the one-way connection thesis. In the following section,
we will critically explore two responses to this challenge that could be developed in
light of the so-called wrong kind of reasons argument.
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3. Could success in action be the wrong kind of reason for belief?
In a nutshell, the wrong kind of reasons argument states the following. Reasons that show p
to be true are the only reasons to believe p. Any other kind of reason to believe p, such as
ﬁnding it enjoyable or beneﬁcial to believe p or wishing p to be true is a reason of the wrong
kind.14 The wrong kind of reasons argument ﬂows directly from the special connection
between belief and truth that the metaphor “belief aims at the truth” is meant to capture.
In particular, the argument expands on some of the implications of recognising truth as
the only standard of correctness for belief: reasons for belief that do not bear on the truth
of its content are either to be excluded from consideration altogether or at least conﬁned
to the very margins of epistemic assessment. Stronger versions of the wrong kind of
reasons argument opt for the ﬁrst strategy, weaker versions, for the second. Let us now
look into the prospects of responding to the challenge to the one-way connection thesis
that each of these two strategies can offer.
Adler and Hicks (2013) put forward a strong version of the wrong kind of reasons argu-
ment. In so doing, they introduce two related distinctions, the ﬁrst between belief and com-
mitment and the second between evidential and non-evidential reasons to believe. Adler
and Hicks argue that only evidential reasons are reasons for belief in the strict sense.
This is because on the normative notion of belief they endorse tracking the available evi-
dence offers the only way of satisfying belief’s standard of correctness. On this notion,
the formulation “belief aims at the truth” entails that belief is evidence-bound.15 By impli-
cation, non-evidential reasons to believe are not directed at the truth (147). Instead, they
speak to the broader, pragmatic interests of believers as agents. According to Adler and
Hicks, these interests can and should be taken into consideration while forming cognitive
attitudes, such as commitment, but have no place in the process of forming beliefs. As they
put it:
If pragmatic considerations were directed not at belief, but at nearby notions like commitment,
they would fall into place as important features of our lives without conﬂicting with the eviden-
tialist conception of belief. We, believers, do not always aim at truth, but belief . . . does. (146)
Adler and Hicks present positive illusions as a case in point. They agree that positive illu-
sions may be pragmatically justiﬁed since there are “circumstances in which responsiveness
to the evidence will lead one to succeed less well (to lose conﬁdence), particularly when the
beliefs are about oneself or a group with which one identiﬁes” (158). However, they reject
the account of positive illusions as false or unwarranted beliefs. Instead, positive illusions
are recast as commitments. This is because although partly responsive to evidence, they are
not exclusively regulated by evidential considerations. And so, unlike beliefs, they can
reﬂect what we may call second-order epistemic strategies that tell believers, for instance,
to accept indecisive evidence as good ground for what’s in fact an unrealistically positive
self-evaluation. Still, this “anti-evidentialist manoeuvring,” as Adler and Hicks term it, does
not provide believers with a reason to believe the content of their positive illusions. With
respect to belief, such strategy inescapably yields only reasons of the wrong kind.
This upshot has direct implications for the challenge from positive illusions. In a way, it
easies the pressure on a normative notion of belief in instances, where success in action
pairs up with disregard for the truth or at least the available evidence. The distinctions
between belief and commitment, evidential and non-evidential reasons reafﬁrm that truth
supplies the only standard of correctness for belief. The implication of succeeding by
getting it wrong is then resisted to the extent that it is conceived as a challenge to truth
as overarching norm of belief. This reprieve, however, does not work in favour of the
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one-way connection thesis. For it is achieved at the expense of denying any interesting con-
nection between the norms of belief and the norms of action. We end up in the unenviable
position that the one-way connection thesis seeks to avoid: believers who are also agents are
routinely pulled in opposite directions. For the strong version of the wrong kind of reasons
argument admits that aiming at the truth and aiming at success may come apart at any point.
By contrast, a weaker version of the wrong kind of reasons argument could allow for a
signiﬁcant normative link between the domains of belief and action. This link ﬂows from
the belief norms to the action norms. Nevertheless, it does not conform to the expectations
set out by the one-way connection thesis. This is because on the weaker version of the
wrong kind of reasons argument, the normativity of belief offers a model for the normativity
of action. To see whether this move can provide a viable alternative in response to the chal-
lenge from positive illusions, let us consider in some detail the relationship that obtains
between these two normative domains on Pamela Hieronymi’s weak version of the
wrong kind of reasons argument.
Hieronymi (2005) makes a case for a comprehensive conception of reasons, including
both reasons for belief and action. On this conception, reasons are understood as consider-
ations that stand in a particular relation. According to Hieronymi, this relation is not sufﬁ-
ciently well-deﬁned in terms of “counting in favour.” The formulation is likely to be
misleading in virtue of being ambiguous. For instance, in the case of belief, “counting in
favour” could mean either showing that a belief’s content is true or alternatively
showing that having a belief with this content is in some way beneﬁcial for a believer.
As a result, the important distinction between these two kinds of reasons does not come
to light. To remedy this situation, Hieronymi proposes that we sharpen up our conception
of reason. On this proposal, reason is an “item in a piece of reasoning” that bears on a ques-
tion and stands in a set of rational relations, for which a person is answerable (443–444).
This alternative formulation makes room for the distinction between constitutive and extrin-
sic reasons. Returning to the case of belief, my reasons for believing p are constitutive if by
ﬁnding them convincing, I form the belief that p. They settle the question whether p for me.
By contrast, extrinsic reasons for believing p do not settle that question. Instead, they settle
another question, whether to form a second-order attitude in favour of bringing about the
belief that p (447–448). Importantly, this conception also applies to reasons for action.
For these reasons are understood as pieces of reasoning that settle the question of
whether to w for an agent. In this respect, both reasons for action and belief are alike.
Yet, unlike beliefs, ordinary intentional actions do not always allow for a sharp distinction
between constitutive and extrinsic reasons. This is because the question of whether to w
may be settled by taking into account a much greater variety of considerations than that
of whether to believe p.On this point, the weaker version of the wrong kind of reasons argu-
ment in Hieronymi (2005) is in agreement with the stronger version in Adler and Hicks
(2013). However, the disanalogy between the domains of belief and action plays a different
dialectical role. For in the weaker version, this disanalogy points to a difference in degree
only. Both belief and action are understood as rational activities that equally engage a
person’s responsibility.16 They are both open to direct rational criticism in terms of answer-
ability for the kinds of considerations that a person takes into account in order to settle ques-
tions, such as whether to believe p or whether to w. The upshot is that extrinsic reasons for
believing are acknowledged as bona ﬁde reasons, albeit peripheral ones. At the same time,
however, the domain of belief takes precedence over that of action. This is because settling
the question of whether to believe p provides a clearer picture of how to satisfy a normative
requirement. This picture is then applied in order to make sense of the norms of action. For
even though the distinction between constitutive and extrinsic reasons is more difﬁcult to
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draw when settling the question of whether to w, it has to be drawn nevertheless. So the
weaker version of the wrong kind of reasons argument supports a one-way connection
from the norms of belief to the norms of action. This connection is to model aiming at
success on aiming at the truth. For action is construed as a messier though relevantly
similar counterpart of belief.
This move helps mitigate the most obvious drawback of the stronger version of the
wrong kind of reasons argument: the rejection of any interesting normative connection
between the domains of belief and action. Nevertheless, it cannot provide a satisfactory
reply to the challenge from positive illusions. True, this challenge might not seem as press-
ing in light of the new way of linking up the norms of action to the norms of belief. For,
unlike the original one-way connection thesis, the weaker version of the wrong kind of
reasons argument does not suggest that the link takes the form of succeeding in virtue of
getting it right. However, if the normative requirements for agents are to be modelled on
the normative requirements for believers, the prominent role extrinsic reasons for belief
seem to play in satisfying the success norm of action in cases of positive illusions should
come as a surprise. The steady correlation between avoiding the truth and successful
action these cases seem to illustrate is at odds with the idea that aiming at success is in prin-
ciple like aiming at the truth.
A related difﬁculty emerges when we take into consideration instances of positive delu-
sions. Looking at the vignette introduced in the previous section, we can see that Simon’s
approach ﬁts the description of settling a question in earnest. Granted, the means he deploys
in this task are, to say the least, idiosyncratic. Yet, they do not amount to wishful thinking or
fantasising about success. The only way to differentiate between the two the weaker version
of the wrong kind of reasons argument gives us is to apply the distinction between consti-
tutive and extrinsic reasons. Simon’s thoughts would then qualify as constitutive reasons
since unlike fantasies they bear directly on the question of what to do in his challenging
circumstance. If we did so, however, we’d collapse the distinction between considerations
that faithfully track the available evidence and considerations that like Simon’s are mark-
edly resistant to it. This move would lead us beyond the wrong kind of reasons argument.
For any recognisable version of it is premised on the idea that to satisfy the underling truth
norm a believer must satisfy the derivative evidence norm. An alternative proposal that
rejects this idea will be articulated in the following section.
4. Getting it right in virtue of succeeding
To recap, proponents of a normative notion of belief may resort to a version of the wrong
kind of reasons argument in order to respond to the challenge from positive illusions. If they
opt for the stronger version, the response is as follows: the lesson we learn from the litera-
ture on positive illusions and follow-up vignette on positive delusions is that there is no
interesting connection between the norms of belief and the norms of action. If they opt
for the weaker version, the response is instead that aiming at success is anchored to
aiming at the truth but not in a way that warrants the compatibility of the two pursuits.
Thus, neither response manages to preserve a robust link between the normative require-
ments we face as believers and the normative requirements we face as agents. This negative
upshot paves the way to a third alternative.
On this alternative response, the lesson we learn from the literature on positive illusions
and follow-up vignette is that the link between the norms of action and the norms of belief is
as robust as assumed by the initial thesis. However, this link takes the form of a two-way
rather than one-way connection. In addition to succeeding by getting it right (achieving the
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aim of action in virtue of achieving the aim of belief), it is normatively appropriate to get it
right by succeeding (achieving the aim of belief in virtue of achieving the aim of action).
The two-way connection thesis builds on a notion of practical knowledge as both non-
observational and causally efﬁcacious with respect to successful actions. As argued in the
opening section of this paper, expression of intention for the future falls within the scope
of this kind of knowledge, along with intentional action that unfolds in the present. Bring-
ing in the subsequent discussion of reasons for belief and action as items of reasoning that
bear on questions, such as whether to believe p and whether to w, it becomes apparent
that an agent’s expression of intention may sufﬁce to support a corresponding belief.
This is because the question of whether to believe p is appropriately settled by settling
the question whether to w when the believer’s w-ing can reliably bring about that p.17
On this occasion, aiming at the truth follows from aiming at success. The satisfaction
of the overarching norm of belief is achieved through the satisfaction of the overarching
norm of action. Getting it right as a believer comes about in virtue of succeeding as an
agent.
As we can see from the above description, the two-way connection thesis recognises
truth as the only standard of correctness for belief. However, unlike the one-way connection
thesis and the two versions of the wrong kind of reasons argument we discussed, the pro-
posed alternative rejects the assumption that this standard can only be met by tracking the
available evidence. Instead, it maintains that this can also be done by engaging the believ-
er’s agency in making it the case that p.18 This fundamental difference derives from the dis-
tinction between two possible readings of what the truth norm actually requires from
believers. A narrow scope reading imposes a further restriction on them, to satisfy the
truth norm by considering the available evidence only. By contrast, a wide scope reading
afﬁrms that the aim of believing truths as opposed to falsehoods can be legitimately
pursued by engaging a believer’s agency in line with the two-way connection thesis out-
lined above. To see why a wide scope reading would serve a normative notion of belief
better than a narrow scope reading, it is helpful to ﬁrst consider the distinction between
the two in its original context, a discussion on the nature and scope of what rationality
may require from us in Broome (2007).
According to Broome, on a narrow scope reading, the rationality requirement is as
follows: “Necessarily, if you believe that you ought to w, then rationality requires you to
intend to w” (359). By contrast, on a wide scope reading, the rationality requirement is
instead: “Necessarily, rationality requires of you that, if you believe you ought to w, you
intend to w” (360). So, while there is only one way to satisfy the narrow scope requirement,
by forming a corresponding intention, there are two ways of satisfying the wide scope
requirement, either by forming a corresponding intention or by abandoning the initial belief.
The distinction is introduced to weigh in on a debate on whether rationality require-
ments, in and of themselves, offer us reason to satisfy them or not. The claim is that, by
ignoring the possibility of a wide scope reading, we would be tempted to conclude that
rationality requirements are unable to provide us with such a reason. Nevertheless, as
Broome points out, the advantages of the wide scope reading do not amount to a deﬁnitive
argument against the alternative, narrow scope reading. What they do instead is to show that
understanding rationality requirements as wide in scope enables rational agents to tackle
possible contradictions between such requirements, while the alternative understanding
leaves them exposed to spiralling irrationality. This striking difference in outcomes is illus-
trated by the conundrum of a person who believes that he ought to w and also believes that
he ought not to w. As Broome (2007, 365) argues, a narrow scope rational requirement
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would commit that person to further irrationality; conversely, a wide scope rational require-
ment would make it possible for them to put things in good order:
But just because you are in an irrational state, that does not mean rationality can be expected to
impose conﬂicting requirements on you. We should expect rationality to require you to get out
of your irrational state, not to get in deeper, into the further irrationality of having contradictory
intentions.
Applying the distinction between wide and narrow scope reading to the truth norm of belief,
there is a clear analogy with respect to the argument this distinction can provide in support
of the two-way connection thesis. To summarise, the point of a wide scope reading is to
demonstrate that there is an alternative way to satisfy the truth norm, in addition to tracking
the available evidence. This alternative way involves the believer’s agency and is conﬁned
to its domain. Hence, the two-way connection thesis is not meant to undermine the evidence
sensitivity commitment at the heart of the one-way connection thesis, but to restrict it suit-
ably. As a result, the two-way connection thesis is in a position to address the challenge to
the one-way connection thesis without jeopardising the normative notion of belief that
underpins both theses. For instead of construing the so-called positive illusions as paradox-
ical cases of succeeding in virtue of getting it wrong, a wide scope reading allows us to see
them for what they are: illustrations of how getting it right as a believer comes about in
virtue of succeeding as an agent.
Still, it might be objected that the two-way connection thesis cannot be extended to
account for the cases we termed positive delusions. For instance, it could be pointed out
that the vignette we discussed involves delusional beliefs with religious as opposed to
factual content that can be proven or disproven by observation. This feature, however, is
only relevant to the argument put forward here to the extent that it provides an extreme
as opposed to mild distortion vis-a`-vis the picture supported by the evidence available to
Simon. Since on a wide scope reading the truth norm can be also satisﬁed by engaging a
believer’s agency in making it the case that p instead of minding the evidence of
whether p, such extreme distortion is compatible with getting it right in virtue of
succeeding.
Saying that the vignette offers a case where the truth norm of belief is satisﬁed by satis-
fying the success norm of action does not commit us to the implausible claim that Simon’s
delusional beliefs have been proven correct in virtue of his professional success. Instead, the
thought is that his set of beliefs whose content can be summed up as “I will win my case”
should be assessed in light of his actually winning the case rather than the delusional beliefs
he cites. Making this point does not hang on favouring an externalist as opposed to intern-
alist interpretation of what counts as evidence or worse, switching imperceptibly between
two incompatible conceptions of evidence. For it could be said, assuming an internalist con-
ception, that the delusional beliefs with religious content are Simon’s evidence for his belief
“I will win my case.” By contrast, assuming an externalist conception, Simon’s evidence for
this belief could be seen as provided by the facts of the matter, his winning the case. This
line of thought is not promising. For it would lead us back to the one-way connection thesis,
with its difﬁculties unresolved. The argument on offer here is different. To recap, it says that
it is permissible to satisfy the truth norm of belief by exercising a believer’s agency, in
addition to considering the available evidence. This claim implies a wide as opposed to
narrow scope interpretation of the truth norm, not an externalist as opposed to internalist
interpretation of the evidence norm.
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5. Conclusion
This paper offered an account on how the norms of belief relate to the norms of action.
The two-way connection thesis defended here grounds a compelling picture, according to
which the overarching truth norm of belief may be satisﬁed in virtue of satisfying the
overarching success norm of action, just as the overarching success norm of action
may be satisﬁed in virtue of satisfying the overarching truth norm of belief. This
picture has the advantage of explaining away so-called positive illusions and other appar-
ent instances of satisfying the success norm as a result of disregarding the truth norm.
This is because unlike competing accounts, such as the one-way connection thesis and
the wrong kind of reasons argument the two-way connection thesis integrates a wide
scope reading of the truth norm. On this reading, engaging a believer’s agency in
making it the case that p is as normatively appropriate way of aiming at the truth as
settling the question of whether p in light of the available evidence. An immediate impli-
cation is to strengthen the case for a normative notion of belief and respectively action.
For on the proposed account aiming at success and aiming at the truth are recognised as
not just compatible but interlocking pursuits.
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Notes
1. Some philosophers who claim that belief aims at the truth in more than a metaphorical sense
explicitly reject the thought that belief is a normative notion that would generate distinctive
requirements for believers. Similarly, some normative theorists explicitly reject the thought
that belief aims at the truth in anything but a metaphorical sense. The present discussion recog-
nises the important differences between these two approaches. The following section expands
on how, in spite of these, there are also important areas of convergence that make the proposed
account applicable to both.
2. Throughout the discussion, “causally efﬁcacious” and “causal efﬁcacy” are meant to refer to the
workings of an efﬁcient as opposed to, for instance, a formal cause, two competing ways of
accounting for the role of practical knowledge in action. I say more on this in the following
section.
3. Further examples of recent teleological accounts include Steglich-Petersen (2006, 2009) and
McHugh (2011). See also Velleman (2000) which offers the ﬁrst distinctly teleological
account of belief in terms of aims.
4. See, for instance, Owens (2003), Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005), which exemplify
this normative approach.
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5. It falls beyond the scope of the present inquiry to argue in favour of such a notion, against poss-
ible alternatives. Thus, I will not discuss either radical critiques of the thought that believing is
something we do in any interesting sense (Heal 1987–1988) or radical rejections of even
weaker epistemic normativity (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007). Similarly, I will not defend a
truth-ﬁrst against a knowledge-ﬁrst view, according to which knowledge is a fundamental epis-
temic norm, irreducible to the truth norm (cf. Williamson 2000). I consider the account put
forward here to be consistent with a knowledge-ﬁst view also; however, I will not undertake
to show this to be the case in the present paper.
6. See, for instance, Steglich-Petersen (2011) on the challenge of providing a teleological account
of epistemic reasons.
7. “Agent’s intention” should be read comprehensively to include all three instances discussed by
Anscombe: the expression of intention for the future, intentional action and intention in action
(1963, 1). This comprehensive reading leads to the rejection of the so-called Simple view of
intention Bratman (1984) criticises for being misleadingly restrictive. In a nutshell, on the
Simple view intention precedes action. This covers only the ﬁrst instance of the Anscombian
triad, expression of intention for the future but not the second and the third, intentional
action and intention in action, which are just as fundamental.
8. Plato’sGorgias (2008, 352b–358d) and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7 offer two clas-
sical formulations of this approach (2001). See also Tenenbaum (2007) for a more recent
development.
9. The essays in Ford, Hornsby, and Stoutland (2011) are representative of main trends in recent
debates. Millgram (2001) also contains some important contributions, see in particular Vogler
(2001).
10. See also Setiya (2008) for an alternative account of practical knowledge, which also links
closely its non-observational character and causal efﬁcacy. This is achieved by introducing a
know-how component: the agent knows what she’s doing without observation because she
knows what she intends to do and she knows how to do it.
11. See in particular the essays in Hunter (2011).
12. See also Hazlett (2013, 39–86) for another argument, which highlights – in the context of a
different discussion, on the eudaimonic value of belief – the signiﬁcance of positive illusions
forming a cohesive pattern where believing falsehoods appears to be consistently preferable
to believing truths.
13. Examples include imaginings and make-belief. Like belief, such attitudes represent their pro-
positional content as true. However, in contrast to belief’s content, the content represented
by, say, an imagining is not thereby accepted as true. See Velleman (2000) for a comprehensive
discussion of this contrast.
14. See, for instance, Hieronymi (2005) and Adler and Hicks (2013).
15. See also Littlejohn (2013) for a discussion on how a commitment to truth as overarching
norm of belief seems to also commit us to a derivative evidence norm. In essence, the
thought is that the truth norm cannot be directly satisﬁed. Instead, believers are required to
ﬁrst satisfy the evidence norm.
16. See Hieronymi (2011) and (2014) for a further discussion on how responsibility for belief relates
to responsibility for action within a uniﬁed account of normativity meant to cover both domains.
17. In a similar vein, the concluding paragraphs of Anscombe’s Intention discuss the natural ﬁt that
exists between expression of intention and expression of belief about what one will do in the
future. These two expressions come apart only in exceptional cases, for example, in anticipation
of obstacles beyond the agent’s control (1963, 91–94).
18. The two-way connection thesis differs signiﬁcantly from a recent proposal by Reisner (2013), in
which the possibility of non-evidential truth norms is illustrated by a series of thought exper-
iments where a believer knows that his believing p will make it the case that p. These “leaps
of knowledge” are not instances of getting it right by succeeding as they do not engage the
believer’s agency. More importantly, they do not advance any hypothesis on how belief
norms relate to action norms. Instead, their role is to explain how different norms within the
domain of belief relate to each another.
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